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INTRODUCTION
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TERTULLIAN S THEOLOGICAL TREATISES
Tertullian's series of theological tractates appears to have been systematically planned, with the intention of discussing disputed points of Christian doctrine in their natural order. Adversus Praxean and De Anima are later additions, the former called for by a new form of heresy, the latter the expression of a new
development,
not so much of Tertullian's thought, as of the importance he attached to this particular aspect of it. The series begins with De Praescriptione Haereticorum, which makes the general claim against all heresies that they stand condemned by the fact of their recent emergence, since the truth must of necessity be that which is taught by the apostolic churches and those in agreement with them----a discreetly veiled and competently argued begging of the question, which has proved to be of much controversial value in both ancient and modern times. Although in his judgement this argument is of itself sufficient to silence all opposition, Tertullian proceeds to take the more influential heresies one by one,
confuting
them on the stronger ground of their failure to conform with Scripture and with natural reason. The five books Adversus Marcionem are a reply to the dangerous theory (which reappeared in a slightly different form, and acquired great popularity, in the third and fourth decades of the present century) that the God of the Old Testament, the Creator of the world, is in moral character as in substantive reality different from the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. There appears to be no direct evidence of the immediate effect of this highly competent work: but as there are some
indications
that in the third century and afterwards Marcionism, though still troublesome, had lost most of its expansive power, it may well be that Tertullian's refutation was not without effect in checking the growth of that heresy.
Marcion had tried to solve the problem of the evil that is in the
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world by the postulate of a malevolent or incompetent creator. The treatise Adversus Hermogenem is a reply to a different attempt to answer this question, this time on the supposition that the Creator had to use a pre-existent matter which was too intractable for him to bring to perfection. This theory, of vaguely Platonic origin, though not it seems derived directly from Plato, reappears in various disguises, and evidently became in some quarters an acceptable solution of what is, after all, a real difficulty. It at least has the honesty of not denying that the problem exists, though the trouble with all these theorists is that they forget that evil is not primarily a matter of chemistry or physics but of morals: they shelve the real problem, while pretending to solve it by the
introduction
of the dangerous and offensive suggestion that material things (including the human body) are of necessity either totally evil or so contaminated with evil as to be beneath God's interest and beyond his saving power.
The gnostic sects attacked the same problem, with a similar result. Their theories are complicated and abstruse, there being almost as many doctrines as teachers, and it appears that the more involved an explanation was, and the more it was wrapped up in great swelling words, the more likely it was to find acceptance. But the sects had this in common, that they treated the creation of the world as a conscious or unconscious act of rebellion against the unknown and unknowable god, and, regarding all created things as evil, envisaged redemption not as the destruction of evil but as the disengagement from it of any sparks of good which may by accident have got entangled in it: they also made individual salvation dependent on knowledge of the secret passwords for the many stages of the upward ascent. The treatise Adversus
Valentinianos
is an account, translated from St Irenaeus, of some of these theories: the church writers thought that the mere setting forth of such pretentious nonsense would be the best refutation of it.
Concerning the two treatises De Carne Christi and De Resurrectione
Carnis Tertullian several times observes that the former is designed to serve as praestructio or scaffolding for the latter. The former indeed has an importance of its own, since it is on the truth of Christ's human nature that the divine scheme for man's
salvation
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depends, and any further aspect of Christian doctrine must be subsidiary to this. But in practice the lesser doctrine was turned back upon the greater. Doubts about the feasibility or necessity or desirability of the resurrection of the flesh of all mankind were easy enough to suggest: there are manifest difficulties, which it is easier to admit than to resolve. Once it was accepted that the so-called resurrection is of the soul alone, and that the body is to have no share in it, it seemed to follow that there was no need for the resurrection of Christ's body, and indeed that there was no need for him to have had a real body at all, but only such a phantasm of a body as should make him for a time visible to those he met. Also, since it now seemed to be proved by default that human flesh has no part in the life to come, being unworthy of God's interest and attention, it was thought to follow that the whole material creation must be the work either of a second god or of a rebellious or misguided angel. Thus the simple and unlearned (who are always, Tertullian remarks, the larger proportion of Christians), being ignorant of the Scriptures and of the power of God, were by virtue of a defective eschatology easily led on to deny the objective truth of the Incarnation, and beyond that to a doctrine of God which is no more than a thinly disguised polytheism.
TERTULLIAN S DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION
Throughout this series of works, on which he had been engaged for more than a decade, Tertullian had put first things first, the doctrine of God before the doctrine of man, the doctrine of
creation
before the doctrine of the last things: and now, the doctrine of the Incarnation having been clearly set forth against four heresies, he was in a position to maintain, as regards man's own destiny, that neither is any part of human nature unworthy or incapable of redemption, nor does God lack the power or the skill to redeem it. He might not have understood our terms, but he would have been at one with us and with the Scriptures in representing Christianity in its authentic form as a thoroughly (though not exclusively) materialistic religion, and in affirming that this present life is not a
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mere period of soul-making but is a preparation for the conservation
and sublimation of the whole of manhood, body, soul, and spirit, in the life to come.
Along with other aspects of Christian teaching, this doctrine had been set forth in clear terms, though in summary form, in one of the earliest works, the Apologeticus, from which it appears that even in non-Christian circles it was well known that this is an essential article of Christian belief. And not only so, but it is clear from the works of previous apologists that however original are some of Tertullian's expressions and however characteristic his vigorous speech, the essentials of this doctrine and the main lines of its defence were not invented by him but were an inheritance from his predecessors in the faith: as likewise the cavils raised against the doctrine were no new thing, but had been canvassed here and there for at least half a century.
Some twelve or more years, then, before writing this monograph
On the Resurrection of the Flesh, Tertullian had expressed himself as follows:1
If some philosopher states (Laberius suggests that Pythagoras thought so) that a mule is changed into a human being or a woman turns into a snake, and into support of that view distorts all manner of arguments by persuasive eloquence, he will certainly move some to assent and will establish this as a dogma. Thus some person will be convinced that he ought to abstain from flesh-meat, for fear of feasting on his great- grandfather when he thinks he is eating beef. Yet if a Christian puts it on record that a man will return to life as a man, John Doe as John Doe, he will be hounded, or even stoned, out of the company.
If there is some principle which demands that the souls of men must be brought back again into bodies, why should they not return into their own identity? For restoration means precisely this, that that which used to be, again is. Otherwise they will not be the same souls as they were: for in becoming what they were not they have to cease to be what they were. It would require many examples, and abundance of
1 Apologeticus 48: on which there are valuable notes by J. E. B. Mayor. The translation here given is from Becker's text, which is substantially the same as that of Hoppe. The meaning of Tertullian's Latin is for the most part perfectly clear: but there probably does not exist another piece of Latin which it is so difficult to turn into satisfactory English.
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leisure, if we were disposed to spread ourselves on the question which man would seem to be converted into which animal. But it has a closer bearing on our position when we postulate that it is much more dignified to suppose that human person will return to life as human person---- anyone as anyone, provided he is human----so that the soul may regain its true nature by being restored to the same characteristics, even if not the same face and figure. And yet, seeing that the reason for this restoration is the judgement which God has appointed, it follows of necessity that the very same person who was before, will have to be brought into court to receive from God judgement upon his merits or demerits. For that reason men's bodies also will be restored again, because soul alone without that solid matter, the flesh, is not capable of sensation,1 and because whatsoever the souls have to suffer by the
judgement
of God, they have deserved it in association with the flesh: for they were enclosed within the flesh when they did all that they have done.
But how, you ask, can matter which has been dispersed be brought together again for judgement? Look at yourself: in your own person you will find the evidence of it. Consider what you were before you were. Nothing. For if you had been anything you would remember it. As you were nothing before you were something, why, when you have become nothing by ceasing to be anything, should you not be able again to come into being out of nothing, by the will of that same Creator who has already out of nothing brought you into being? Nothing new will happen to you. You did not exist, yet were brought into existence. Describe, if you can, how you have come to exist: then you may ask how you will again come to exist. Moreover, it will be easier for you to be made once more what you have already been, in that equally without difficulty have you already been made what once you never were.
Doubts will be entertained, perhaps, of the power of God. Yet by him this great mass which is the world has been constituted out of that which was not, as it were out of the death of vacuity and nonentity, and has been animated with that spirit which gives life to all souls: it is itself a signed portrait of the resurrection of mankind, for a testimony to you. Daily the light is slain, and shines anew: darkness by the same sequence departs and returns: constellations which have died come to life again: seasons end and begin: fruits ripen and return: certainly grain rises in greater fertility only after it has decayed away and dispersed: all things
1 Tertullian was still of this opinion when he wrote De Testimonio Animae 4: at De Resurrectione Carnis 17 he is seen to have changed his mind.
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are preserved by being destroyed, all are brought into shape again out of perdition. If you have learned, at least from the Delphic inscription, to understand yourself, you know how noble is the name of man: and are you, the lord of all things that die and that rise again, to die only so as to perish? Whatever you are dissolved into, whichever of the four
elements
brings you to destruction, sucks you in, wipes you out, reduces you to nothing, that will give you back again: nothingness itself is subject to you to whom everything is subject.
In that case, you object, we shall for ever have to be dying and rising again. If the Lord of all things had so decreed, you would have obeyed the law of your being whether you would or not. But in fact he has decreed no otherwise than he has declared. That divine Reason which composed the universe out of things diverse, to the intent that out of opposing entities all things should stand together in unity----out of emptiness and fullness, animate and inanimate, comprehensible and incomprehensible, light and darkness, and even life and death----that same Reason has compacted time itself in such determinate and ordered sequence, that this first part of it, in which we have been living since the beginning of creation, should by limitation of time flow down to an end, but that that other part, which we stand in expectation of, should pass forward into endless eternity. So when it has reached that
boundary,
that gulf which gapes between, the fashion of this world, no less limited in time, which now is spread out like a curtain to cover that other eternal order, will itself suffer change: and thereupon will ensue a restoration of the whole human race, for the reckoning up of what of good or evil it has merited in this present age, and thereafter the paying up of what is owed, right on into the unmeasurable timelessness of eternity.
And so there will be no more death, nor any resurrection often repeated. We shall be the same persons as we now are, nor ever again shall we be other: the worshippers of God always in his presence, clothed upon with substance proper to eternity: but the profane, and such as are not perfect towards God, in the penalty of no less perpetual fire, receiving from the very nature of that fire, which is from God, a supplement of indestructibility. Even philosophers know the difference between mystic and natural fire. Far different is that which serves men's use from that which serves the judgement of God, whether it is hurled as lightning from heaven or belches forth from the earth at the mountain- tops: for this does not consume what it burns up, but restores while it destroys. Consequently the mountains remain, for ever burning: and
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one struck by lightning is safe for ever from again being burnt to ashes by fire. This then may stand for a token of the everlasting fire, an example of perennial judgement feeding its own penalty. Mountains burn up and yet endure: why not evil-doers and the enemies of God?
Here we have in summary form the doctrine, and the arguments
in support of it, which Tertullian was to develop at greater length some ten or twelve years later. It is a doctrine of the
continued
life of the soul after death, and of the final reconstitution of the body, with the restoration of the complete personality of body and soul at the end of the world, at Christ's appearing. Neither in this summary nor in the larger treatise does Tertullian complicate matters by insistence on the millennial reign of Christ: though he was acquainted with the Apocalypse of John, and cannot, when writing the treatise, have been ignorant of Montanist expectations.
Of themes afterwards developed at greater length, we have here a reference to those of the philosophers who postulate the soul's survival and even, in some cases, its reincarnation. We have the claim that for purposes of divine judgement personal identity is required, and that this can only be ensured if each soul is returned to its own body. In reply to suggested or presumed difficulties in the reconstitution of bodies buried and decayed, we have the argument that God, who has once already brought things into existence out of nothing, evidently has power, and must find it easier, to reconstitute those same things out of dissolution. Examples, not entirely persuasive, but evidently a commonplace in such discussions, are given of phenomena akin to or suggesting resurrection in the natural order of the world: and, along with them, we find here a fair enough argument (which is not
reproduced
in the longer treatise) that as the world was made for man's sake it would be a strange thing if the world itself rises again while man who is its lord does not: for eius est nihilum ipsum cuius et totum. Unencumbered, as already remarked, by the millenary interval which others take over from the Apocalypse, we have the distinction between this age and the age to come, the present age falling like a curtain over that other eternal order----quae illi
dispositioni
aeternitatis aulaei vice oppansa est----so that the resurrection once accomplished becomes a permanent fact, not an event to be often
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repeated. It follows that there is no more death: and as neither Tertullian nor his contemporaries, nor the New Testament itself, is afraid of hard facts and hard sayings, there is a reference here, not repeated in this precise form in the treatise, to that penal fire which makes indestructible that which it even destroys.
THE ARGUMENT OF THIS WORK
Tertullian's original intention appears to have been to cast De Carne Christi and De Resurrectione Carnis into the form of controversiae,
as if they had been the actio prima and actio secunda of a case argued in court. The earlier work has all the marks of the actual speech which it certainly never was. It fits into the
conventional
framework of principium, followed by narratio and reprehensio,
with amplificatio and conclusio; it abounds in such asides as might have been supposed to embarrass an adversary, while
moving
the court to sympathetic amusement: and it answers, as it were in passing, pretended interjections by the opponent party. The later work retains very few traces of this. Certainly there is ordered arrangement of subject-matter: but it is that of a treatise rather than a speech. There are no asides, no hint of an adversary present in court, and no suggestion of an audience. In fact, the work is addressed to readers rather than listeners, or at least to such listeners as at a private reading can ask for abstruse and closely argued passages to be repeated once and again.
The argument is worked out in five stages. The first (§§1-4), which almost serves the usual purpose of an exordium, relates the heretical half-beliefs with which Tertullian is in conflict, to the opinions of philosophers and to the prejudices of the general non- Christian public. In part two (§§5-17) are set out the general principles which are to govern the interpretation of the relevant passages of Scripture: namely, the dignity of the flesh, the power of God, and the necessary requirements of divine judgement. Parts three (§§18-39) and four (§§40-56) take up the testimony of the Scriptures, first expounding their positive teaching, and then rescuing from perverse misunderstanding or misinterpretation a number of apostolic texts of which the adversaries have claimed
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the support. Part five (§§57-62) is a reply to a further set of difficulties
and objections. The concluding chapter (§63) may be regarded as a sort of peroration: it summarizes the argument, and claims the support and enlightenment of the new prophecy. Within this framework the details are worked out as follows:
(i) Preliminary observations: the pagan origin of doubts about the faith
The general public, which dishonours its dead by cremating them, and honours them by sacrificing to them, is inconsistent with itself. Philosophers also are not in agreement, some saying that death is the end of all things, while others allege that the soul survives, and even enters again into other bodies either animal or human (§1). Such heretics as deny the resurrection of the flesh are forced to deny both the verity of the flesh of Christ and the unity of God. On these matters we have already answered them: our present task is to maintain the completeness of man's salvation. Among such as profess to be Christians there seems to be no overt denial of the survival of the soul (§2). It is not always safe to base theological argument on popular opinions: this ought only to be done for affirmation, not for denial: and in any case divine truth does not always consist of what is obvious (§3): so it is without good warrant that heretics have borrowed from the heathen the whole fabric of the attack they make on the flesh (§4).
(ii) General principles concerning the dignity of the flesh: the power of God: the rationale of divine judgement
(a) The dignity of the flesh derives from the fact that it is God's handiwork, and that the clay shaped by God's hand was called 'man' even before God gave it a soul (§5). While the clay was taking shape under God's hand, his thought was of the manhood which Christ was to assume: for it says that man was made in the image of God, and 'God' here means Christ who was to take manhood upon him. In such a way as this can a thing become more honourable than what it is made of (§6). The suggestion that the coats of skins with which God clothed fallen man signify flesh (and thus that man's flesh is a consequence of his sin) cannot stand:
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Adam already possessed flesh when Eve was formed out of him. Also if flesh is the servant of the soul, it is even more honourable on that account, since soul is the breeze of the breath of God, which yet without the flesh can bring nothing to effect (§7). The soul cannot obtain salvation unless while in the flesh it has become a believer, through the flesh as intermediary has received the divine mysteries, and by the flesh as agent has suffered for Christ's sake: and as soul and flesh are so closely united in act, it is inconceivable that they should be divided in reward (§8). These being the dignities of the flesh, it is not possible that God should abandon it to destruction (§9). Such reproaches against the flesh as are to be found in Scripture are really directed against the soul which has misused the flesh for lower purposes: and as there are other places where the flesh is spoken well of, we must think it more consistent with God's goodness to save that which he
sometimes
praises than to condemn it because he has at times expressed disapproval of it (§10).
(b) If there is any question whether God is competent to restore to existence flesh which has decayed, we answer that as it is easier to remake than to make, God is certainly able to recover what has been dispersed (§11). Nature itself, with its perpetual dying and coming to life again, is a standing example of God's power to bring life out of death (§12): and so is that strange bird the phoenix (§13).
(c) As the purpose of the resurrection is that mankind should appear before God's judgement-seat, evidently that judgement cannot be complete unless every man is presented entire (§14). The soul has never acted without the flesh: even its thoughts are mediated either by brain or by heart, and these are part of the flesh: also since God as judge is neither unjust nor negligent he has to treat the flesh as the soul's associate whether in penalty or in reward (§15). The quibble that the flesh, as a mere instrument of the soul, has no moral responsibility, is of no value: for if it is innocent it ought to be rewarded: and in practice even
instruments
are not exempt from praise or blame. Moreover the flesh is not an instrument of the soul, but its associate, as the apostle indicates when he enjoins us to glorify God in our bodies (§16).
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Simple people suppose that the flesh will have to rise again because soul without flesh has no sensation, and thus can neither be punished nor rewarded. But in fact the soul, having a certain
substantiality
of its own, is not devoid of sensation. So it can before the resurrection be paying the penalty of its own misdeeds; but it needs also the resurrection of the flesh, so that it may pay its debts in full by the agency of the same flesh which has been the agent of its activities (§17).
(iii) The evidence of Scripture: (i) its positive content
(a) Since the Christian hope is of the resurrection of the dead, it follows that that which is to rise again must be that which has died, namely the flesh: for the soul does not die at death any more than it dies in sleep (§18). Consequently we cannot agree with such as desire to interpret the resurrection in an allegorical sense, alleging that those are already risen again who have put on Christ in baptism (§19). For, in the first place, it is not true that the prophets did all their preaching by allegory (§20): quite often they spoke in plain terms: and, as that is so, we must assume that so fundamental an article of faith as this would not just be darkly hinted at (§21). Secondly, the evidence of Scripture itself is that the resurrection has not yet taken place, its times being fixed at the second coming of Christ, the signs of which are not yet in evidence (§22). Again, it is true that the apostle, in saying that we have been buried with Christ and have been raised up again in him, refers to a spiritual resurrection: but he does so without any
appearance
of denying a physical one (§23): and the times of our Lord's coming and the signs of its approach are clearly set forth to the Thessalonians (§24) and in the Apocalypse of John (§25).
(b) Figurative speech, when it does occur, is rather in our favour. For example, since it was said, Earth thou art, anything of divine wrath or divine grace which the Scriptures threaten or promise to the earth, may be interpreted as referring to man's flesh (§26): so also references to clothing that did not wear out, and certain similar texts, can be allegories of the hope of the flesh (§27). We may also apply to the flesh anything the Scriptures say about blood (§28).
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(c) If allegorical speech is in our favour, how much more is this true of prophecies which describe in set terms the resurrection of the flesh, as does Ezekiel's vision of the valley of the dry bones (§29). Attempts are made to convert this into an allegory of the restoration of the Jewish state after its dispersion: but we answer that nothing could be an allegory of anything unless it first
represented
a literal fact (§30): so that this parable, like a number of other prophecies, does not refer to the present state of Jewry but to the future hope of all mankind (§31). When it is written that the fishes of the sea and the beasts of the earth will give back the bodies they have devoured, this too must be taken literally: for it is remarkable that heretics never attempt to allegorize away any references to the soul, whereas whatever is written with reference to the flesh, or any part of it, they interpret as meaning anything or everything but what it says (§32).
(d) It is not true to say that our Lord spoke all things in parables: he spoke some things plainly, and must be taken to have meant what he said (§33). For example, he came to save that which was lost: and this means the whole man. When he says that of all that the Father has given him he will lose nothing, by 'all' he means complete manhood, combined of flesh and soul (§34). When he speaks of the possibility of soul and body being destroyed in hell, he cannot be referring to any but the natural body (§35). In his answer to the Sadducees he evidently affirms the
resurrection
in the sense in which they denied it, namely of both soul and body (§36). When he says that the flesh profiteth nothing he does not mean that it is incapable of receiving profit: it can receive profit from the Spirit which giveth life, that is, from the Word who was made flesh. And when he says that all who are in the tombs will hear the voice of the Son of God, and will live, he must be referring to the flesh: for souls are not buried in tombs (§37). His deeds also are in agreement with his words: when he raises the dead, he raises them entire (§38).
(e) The apostle, both before the Sanhédrin and in the presence of Festus, professed the same manner of resurrection as the prophets had spoken of: and the men of Athens understood him to the same effect (§39).
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(iv) The evidence of Scripture: (2) correction of misunderstandings
(a) The outer and the inner man (2 Cor. 4.16-5.10). By the inner man the apostle means not (as some allege) the soul itself, but mind and spirit, which are functions of soul: and when he says that the outer man is being dissolved he means not that the flesh suffers destruction after death but that even now it is being worn down by toils and torments (§40). In the same sense, and in the same context, he refers to the earthly house of our tabernacle being dissolved, and to the building which we have from God, eternal in the heavens (§41): and when he says here that we desire not to be unclothed but to be clothed upon, he means the same as when he says elsewhere that the flesh when it has risen again will be changed by the addition of an angelic quality (§42). When he says that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord, by absence from the Lord he means not the fact of being in the flesh, but that meanwhile we have to walk by faith and not by sight: and as he says (in the same connection) that we must all stand before the judgement-seat of Christ, evidently by 'all' he means the whole of each of us (§43). He has previously spoken of our having treasure in earthen vessels, not meaning that the vessels will be destroyed because of their earthly origin, but that they will be preserved because they contain divine treasure: for he adds that the life of Christ will be manifested in our body: and this can only be when we rise again, as Christ has already risen (§44).
(b) The old man and the new man (Eph. 4. 22;
Rom. 8. 8, 6. 6; i Thess. 5. 23). We maintain that this distinction indicates a dif- ference not of substance but of moral character (§45): for we frequently find the apostle condemning the works of the flesh in such terms as appear to involve a condemnation of the flesh itself, yet by the context of each of these expressions guarding against this misunderstanding: as, for example, when he says that those who are in the flesh cannot please God, and immediately adds, Ye are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, though physically they were still in the flesh (§46). So also the old man, crucified together with Christ, is shown by the context to indicate a worldly and
sinful
life: for it is not in fact true that in a physical sense we have been
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crucified with Christ. When writing to the Thessalonians, the apostle prays that their spirit, soul, and body may be made perfect: and that is to take place at the coming of our Lord, which will open the door for the resurrection (§47).
(c) 'Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God' (1 Cor. 15.
50). The answer to the doubt suggested by this sentence is to be found in the argument of the whole chapter. The apostle begins by insisting on the fact of Christ's resurrection, and argues that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ cannot have risen and the whole Christian faith falls to the ground (§48). When he distinguishes between the first man, from the earth, earthy, and the second Man who is from heaven, he indicates a difference of character, and consequently of dignity, though not of substance: for both alike have the name and attributes of man (§49). It is true that flesh and blood by their own power are incapable of inheriting the kingdom, or of anything else: but the Spirit both quickens them and makes them capable of inheriting (§50). It is inconceivable that the apostle should have so peremptorily excluded flesh and blood from heaven, when Jesus is already there in the flesh and blood in which he ascended and in which he will come again (§51). The parable of the seed which is buried in the ground, and decays and comes to life again, indicates that the same flesh will rise which is buried, but in greater fullness: so also the reference to different kinds of flesh, and of bodies celestial and terrestrial, envisages different degrees of glory, but the same
substance (§52). By 'natural' (or soul-informed) body the apostle does not mean the soul: for soul is not soul-informed but soul- informing: so that 'natural body' means soul-informed flesh. Also soul is not buried but flesh is: and it is that which is buried which is to rise again. The flesh is at present natural or soul-informed, and not yet spiritual or spirit-informed: for it has as yet received its full equipment of soul but only the earnest of the Spirit (§53). When the mortal thing is swallowed up of life it will not thereby perish. It is death which will perish, for death is not capable of immortality: the mortal thing, by the destruction of death, is so capable (§54). The apostle says, We shall be changed. Change is by no means the same thing as abolition: various examples prove
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that a thing or person can be changed, and yet remain the same (§55). Finally, it would be inconsistent with God's righteousness that one thing should do the works, and another thing substituted for it should receive the reward: so that any suggestion of a 'resurrection body', specially created for the purpose, is bound to
fail (§56).
(v) Answers to further cavils
(a) The unbelieving ask whether the blind, the lame, and the diseased are to rise again to a renewal of their disabilities. These are wilfully ignorant that God is able, by the change the apostle speaks of, to confer both immortality and incorruption: and this implies the restoration of both health and integrity (§57). After the resurrection there is to be everlasting joy, with neither sorrow nor sighing: and how could this be, unless the causes of sorrow were removed (§58)? The apostle says that all things are ours, both things present and things to come. Thus the world to come is for man's sake, and there is no room for doubt that our earthly substance is capable of being brought into possession of things eternal (§59).
(b) The question is also asked, what need there is for the restoration of those members of the body for which in the life to come there will be no use. Our answer is, first, that even if their functions cease, they must at least be retained for judgement: also, their functions could not have ceased unless they themselves were still existent: and thirdly, that in God's sight none of our members will be without its function (§60): for when terrestrial functions cease, celestial functions take their place (§61). Angels are known to have assumed human substance while retaining their own: what is to prevent men from retaining their own substance while assuming the attributes of angels (§62)?
(vi) Conclusion
The flesh will rise again, the whole of it, in its own identity and in its full perfection. Any doubts there can have been on this matter, suggested by obscure places of Scripture, are now set at rest by the removal of all obscurities through the revelations of the new prophecy (§63).
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THE APOLOGISTS AND ST IRENAEUS
The doctrine in its main lines is proved by Tertullian to be based on New Testament and other scriptural authority. The extracts which follow will show that both it and the forms of its defence are the subject of a continuous Christian tradition. The apologists indicate that even unbelievers were aware that this was a
fundamental
Christian doctrine, foolish enough in appearance to merit no less scorn than that other strange doctrine that there is one only God. Their remarks on this subject make it clear that they are aware of at least some of the arguments which Irenaeus and Tertullian were to set out in systematic form. Irenaeus, in
controversy
with heretics and not with pagans, can make more abundant use of scriptural evidence: there can be no doubt that Tertullian here as elsewhere knew and used his work.
At the same time it appears that in addition to heretics who have found dogmatic reasons for denying the resurrection, there are recurrent objections on what may be called practical grounds, which repeatedly call for an answer. It would hardly be true to say that there is evidence of a concurrent negative, or semi- negative, tradition: rather is it that, in the second century as in the twentieth, there are some who, influenced by the communis sensus (as Tertullian remarks) of their non-Christian neighbours, are moved by manifest difficulties of a physiological nature to a denial of this part of the Christian hope. The difficulties, we have to admit, are real ones: to second-century minds influenced by the bastard Platonism of the gnostics, as to twentieth-century minds fed on the bastard hinduism of theosophy and popular journalism, they seem insuperable, and it is possible that the solutions of them offered by orthodox apologists both then and now are calculated to persuade only such as are already disposed to be persuaded. Probably the most effective argument, and the one least often used, is the moral one that nemo tam carnaliter vivit quam qui negant carnis resurrectionem: negantes enim et poenam despiciunt et
disciplinant:1
a fact of which the present age provides evidence enough. In any case the strength of the Christian conviction that the body is to
1 Tertullian, De Res. Carn. 11.
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rise again is shown by the fact that Origen, who stands almost outside all tradition, the founder of a tradition of his own, is, unless Rufinus seriously misrepresents him, both aware of the difficulties, and insistent that the doctrine is what it is and that the Scriptures mean what they say.
Justin Martyr
At Apology i. 8 Justin observes that Christians could, if they would, deny the faith and escape persecution: but they are in haste to be in God's presence, and have in mind the judgement of Christ. It appears from this that Justin was of the same mind as Tertullian, that only the martyrs pass on at death straight to Paradise.1 Justin says that Plato speaks of judgement by Rhadamanthys and Minos, that they will punish the unjust who are brought before them: he continues 'We also affirm that this will be done, but by Christ, while men with their souls return into the same bodies to be chastised with eternal chastisement, not merely a period of a thousand years, which was all that Plato spoke of.'2 By this last observation Justin should not be thought to dissociate himself from Christian millenarism: he had in fact learned that doctrine from the Apocalypse of John.3 He adds that if we are in error in this we hurt no one but ourselves, and are not deserving of punishment: a sentiment echoed by Athenagoras.
At Apology i. 18 and 19 Justin says that the survival of souls is proved by well-attested records of possession, haunting, and so forth, and is vouched for by philosophers and poets. 'You would do well', he suggests, 'to give us no less acceptance than you give them, seeing we trust God not less than they, but more, since we expect to receive back again even our bodies which have died and
1 Tertullian however, De Anima 55, gives the impression that this was a new doctrine recently revealed to Perpetua near the day of her martyrdom.
2 Apol. i. 8: h(mei=j de\ to_ au)to_ pra~gma& famen genh&sesqai, a)ll' u(po_ tou~ Xristou~, ka)n toi=j au)toi=j sw&masi meta_ tw~n yuxw~n ginome/nwn kai\ a0wni/an ko&lasin kolasqhsome/nwn, a)ll' ou)xi\ xiliontaeth~ peri/odon w(j e0kei=noj e1fh mo&non. The Greek syntax is at fault, but its sense is clear.
3 So Dial 80, 81, quoted below.
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been laid in the earth: for we say that nothing is impossible to God.' Resurrection, he adds, is no more inconceivable than, if we had never existed, would be the statement that it is possible that out of a small drop of moisture, human seed, bones and sinews and flesh should be built up, as we see they are.1 He then quotes Luke 18. 27, Things impossible with men are possible with God: as do Athenagoras and Theophilus in connection with the same idea.
At Apology i. 52 and 53 he observes that the prophets have spoken of two comings of Christ, the one as a dishonoured and passible man, and the other when, coming with great glory, he will raise up the bodies of all men that have been: the bodies of those who are worthy he will clothe with incorruption, while those of the unrighteous he will in eternal sentiency send with the evil demons into the eternal fire. Justin quotes here Ezek. 37. 7, 'Joint to joint and bone to bone'. It would be possible, he
proceeds,
to produce other prophecies to the same effect: on such our faith is built: 'For by what reasoning should we have believed a crucified Man, that he is the first-begotten of the unbegotten God, and himself will conduct the judgement of the whole human race, unless before he came, and became Man, we had found testimonies published concerning him, and now saw them fulfilled?'2
At Apology II. 9, addressing the Senate, Justin argues that if there is no judgement, either there is no god, or else, if there is a god, he cares not for man, and there is no such thing as morality.
Dialogue 69. Here Justin says that our Lord's miracles were a challenge to the men of that day to acknowledge him: instead of which they called him a magician and a deceiver. 'Also he did these things to persuade those who should in the future believe on him that even though a man have some defect of body, but is a keeper of the doctrines delivered by him, he will at his second coming raise him up again and will also make him entire and
1 Apol. I. 18, e0k mikra~j tinoj r(ani/doj th~j tou~ a)nqrwpei/ou spe/rmatoj dunato_n o)ste/a te kai\ neu~ra kai\ sa&rkaj ei0konopoihqe/nta oi}a o(rw~men gene/sqai.
2 Apol. i. 53. The last clause runs eu#romen kai\ ou#twj geno&mena o(rw~men. Perhaps read
o(rw|~men: 'we had found . . .and now saw'.
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immortal and incorruptible and incapable of grief.'1 With this we may compare what Tertullian writes, §§57, 58.
At Dialogue 80, 81 Justin warns Trypho that he may meet with some so-called Christians who deny the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, and allege that there is no resurrection of the
dead, claiming that immediately they die their souls are taken up into heaven.2 These, says Justin, are not to be reckoned as Christians, any more than you Jews would acknowledge as Jews people such as the Sadducees and a number of other sects. I, he continues, and all who are thoroughly orthodox Christians,3 are assured that there will be a resurrection of the flesh, followed by a thousand years in Jerusalem, rebuilt, adorned, and enlarged: with a quotation of Isa. 65. 17-25, and, 'There was among us a man named John, who in a revelation which came to him prophesied that those who believed in our Christ would be in Jerusalem for a thousand years, and after that would come the catholic and (to speak briefly) eternal general resurrection of all men, and also the judgement: as our Lord also said, They will neither marry nor be given in marriage but will be equal to angels, being children of God and of the resurrection'. Here Justin professes the millenarism which at Apology i. 8 he has passed over. The expression 'catholic
resurrection'
is repeated by Theophilus.4
1 The last sentence is, o(lo&klhron au)to_n e0n th|~ deute/ra| au)tou~ parousi/a| meta_ tou~ kai\ a)qa&naton kai\ a!fqarton kai\ a)lu&phton poih~sai a)nasth&sei.
2 These could be Marcionites, and this would be one of the earliest references to them. The final claim has among modern non-practising professing Christians been expanded into the belief that all men go to heaven when they die: it would be undemocratic of God to make any distinction.
3 o)rqognw&monej kata_ pa&nta Xristianoi/.
4 Concerning the authenticity of the fragments of a treatise On the
Resurrection,
attributed by John of Damascus to St Justin, philosopher and martyr (Otto, vol. II, pp. 208-45), there seems to be some doubt. Bardenhewer is non- committal, though inclined towards acceptance. In fact these are rather more than fragments, being a well argued and well arranged discussion of the entire question. They contain practically nothing which is not met with elsewhere, and probably no ideas which could not have occurred to Justin. What is unlikely is that he could have reduced his usual discursive style to such precise and logical order, or that he could to this extent, in arguing against Christians, have abstained
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Athenagoras
Supplicatio 36. At the conclusion of his disproof of the accusation of ritual cannibalism Athenagoras claims that persons who believe there will be a resurrection could by no means be given to such a practice. It is ridiculous, he says, to suppose that while the earth will give up its dead, men would not give up the dead they had swallowed. It is more likely that persons who think they will have no account to give, will abstain from no sort of atrocity: whereas such as are persuaded that no act will be left unexamined before God, and that the body which has ministered to the
irrational
impulses of the soul will share in its punishment, will avoid even the slightest sin. If this seems like nonsense, it is at least not wicked: for by the arguments with which we delude ourselves, we injure nobody. Some of the philosophers think as we do: but the present is not the place for philosophical arguments, or for us to claim the support of Pythagoras and Plato.
The treatise On the Resurrection of the Dead, which in the manuscripts
follows the Supplicatio and is commonly attributed to Athenagoras, is of doubtful authenticity.1 It is much more
discursive
than either Irenaeus or Tertullian, its argument being for the most part based on natural reason. There are very few
scriptural
quotations----about three altogether, which is far fewer than Justin introduces in his addresses to the Emperors and the Senate. There is a freshness about this work similar to that of the treatise on this subject ascribed to Justin, a freshness which suggests that it is hardly beholden to anyone in particular, though it is true that many of the points of its argument appear also in other writers and seem to have become Christian commonplace. Such are the suggestion (§2) that it would only be possible for the adversaries
from scriptural quotations. Another extract from the same work by Methodius of Olympus (Otto, p. 250) may be either the original or a reflection of Irenaeus' and Tertullian's remarks on I Cor. 15. 50:
klhronomei=sqai me\n to_ a)poqnh~skon, klhronomei=n de\ to_ zw~n le/gei, kai\ a)poqnh&skein me\n sa&rka, zh~n de\ th_n basilei/an tw~n ou)ranw~n.
1 For a critical discussion of the ascription to Athenagoras see R. M. Grant in Harvard Theological Review (January 1954).
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to disprove the resurrection if they could show that God would either find it impossible or think it undesirable to unify and collect into their previous human identities such bodies as had died and been entirely dissolved:1 and with this its corollary that if God should think it undesirable this must be either because injustice would be involved in his doing of it, or because it would be beneath his dignity to do it:2 with a further argument based upon this In §3 we have a reference to the undue respect of the wise for the doubts of the vulgar. In §12 a description of the changes which the human body experiences during the present life concludes with the remark that the resurrection, as well as the change for the better in the condition of those still alive at that time, is itself a sort of metabolism, the last and final one.3 In several places the author insists on the joint activity and the inseparable responsibility of soul and body, as in the eloquent passage (§15) which begins with the postulate that 'all human nature in general is composed of immortal soul and the body which at birth was compacted with it', and reaches the conclusion that 'he who has had conferred upon him mind and reason is not soul by itself, but man: so that it is man, who is composed of both soul and body, who must abide for ever'.4 So again (§20) he repeats that the actor in all matters which come under divine judgement has been the man, not his soul alone: and (§21) that the body will suffer injustice if, having joined with the soul in the righteous acts, it does not share in the reward.
Although addressed to Christians this work is strangely sparing of scriptural quotations: and these, about three in number, are introduced not as the basis of a proof, but in illustration of a point already made. Such are the combined reference5 to I Cor. 15. 53
1 Athenagoras, De Res. Mort. 2, e0a_n dei=cai dunhqw~sin h2 a)du&naton o2n tw~| qew|~ h2 a)bou&lhton ta_ nekrwqe/nta tw~n swma&twn h2 kai\ pa&nth dialuqe/nta e9nw~sai kai\ sunagagei=n pro_j th_n tw~n au)tw~n a)nqrw&pwn su&stasin.
2 Ibid.: to_ ga_r a)bou&lhton h2 w(j a!dikon au)tw~| e0stin a)bou&lhton h2 w(j a)na&cion.
3 Ibid. 12: ei]do&j ti metabolh~j kai\ pa&ntwn u#staton.
4 So also ibid. 23: ou) ga_r yuxai\ yuxa_j gennw~sai th_n tou~ patro_j h2 th~j mhte/roj oi0keiou~ntai proshgori/an, a)ll' a)nqrw&pouj a!nqrwpoi.
5 Ibid. 18.
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and 2 Cor. 5.10: 'It is clear to all that according to the apostle this corruptible must put on incorruption, so that... each one may justly receive the things which he has done by his body, whether good things or evil': which answers in advance Tertullian's question1 about hyperbaton. In the following chapter we have a reference to 'Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die', as a common dogma and single law highly in favour with the lecherous and gluttonous: which also is commented on by Tertullian.2
There are two themes which in this work are treated more fully than elsewhere at that early date. In sections 4 to 8 we have a curious argument addressed to those who wonder what will happen at the resurrection to those parts of one man's body which have become parts of another man's either by cannibalism or by their being consumed by animals and thus transferred to other men. The author replies that for each animal God has provided its proper food, from which alone it receives true nourishment:
whatever
does not satisfy these conditions is either rejected and ejected, or else is used for the building up of those corporal elements (such as the four humours) which will not be required at the
resurrection.
Thus the question, At the resurrection, to which body will this or that portion of matter belong? could only arise if it were first proved that the natural food of human beings is human flesh: which is impossible. The other side of this problem has already been touched upon in the Supplicatio, where the claim is made that persons who believe in the resurrection could not possibly be given to the cannibalistic practices of which Christians are accused. The suggestion that the blood and the other humours will not be required at the resurrection would not have met with Tertullian's approval.3
Much more significant is the emphasis laid on the teleological argument, which runs like a thread through the whole. So we have (§12): 'To those who bear in themselves the very image of their Creator, who are possessed of a mind and are endowed with rational judgement, their Creator has allotted continuity without
1 De Res. Carn. 43.
2 Ibid. 49.
3 De Res. Carn. 28.
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end, so that they might come to know their own Creator, his power and wisdom, and while following law and justice might without labour spend the life to come in the company of these virtues with which they had fortified their previous life, although they were then in corruptible and earthly bodies.'1 This argument, Aristotelian in principle and method, but reaching a far from Aristotelian conclusion, shows the author of this work to have been a not unworthy student of the master of those who know.
Theophilus
Since Theophilus addresses his work to a single person, a friend or acquaintance, he is in a position to use the more personal argument of an appeal to the faith which can make unnecessary the more objective kind of argument. So he says,2 'Faith is a precondition of all acts and facts', and asks why his acquaintance cannot entrust himself to God who has given such manifest tokens of himself by having formed man out of almost negligibly small material:3 'Why not then believe that God, who has already made you, is able also to make you again?'4 There is also5 the standard
argument
about the decline and return of seasons, of days and nights, of seed and fruit, etc., with quotation of John 12. 24 and I Cor. 15. 36, 37: to which is added a further instance of a tree which grew on a mountain from a seed dropped in a bird's excrement. All these, Theophilus remarks, are works of God's wisdom, designed to show that God is able also to accomplish the catholic resurrection of all mankind. Again he observes6 that the works of the third day of Creation, the replenishment of the seas, and so forth,
1 Athenagoras, De Res. Mort. 12: toi=j de\ au)to_n e0n e9autoi=j a)galmatoforou~si to_n poihth&n, nou~n te sumperiferome/noij kai\ logikh~j kri/sewj memoirame/noij, th_n ei0j a)ei\ diamonh_n a)peklh&rwsen o( poihth&j, i3na ginw&skontej to_n e(autw~n poihth_n
kai\ th_n tou&tou du&nami/n te kai\ sofi/an, no&mw| te sunepo&menoi kai\ di/kh|, tou&toij
sundiaiwni/zwsin a)po&nwj oi[j th_n prolabou~san e0kra&tunan zwh&n, kai/per e0n fqartoij kai ghi/noij o!ntej sw&masin\.
2 Theophilus, Ad Autol. i. 8, a(pa&ntwn pragma&twn h( pi/stij prohgei=tai.
3 Ibid. e0c u(gra~j ou)si/aj mikra~j kai\ e0laxi/sthj r(ani/doj h#tij ou)de\ au)th_ h{n pote.
4 This seems to be the meaning of the strange expression metacu_ poih~sai.
5 Ibid. I. 13.
6 Ibid. II. 14.
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illustrate the resurrection. But his first mention of the matter most clearly states his position:1 'Before all things let there prevail in your heart faith and the fear of God, and so you will understand these things. When you put off mortality and put on incorruption you will see God as you ought: for he will raise up your flesh immortal along with your soul, and then, having been made immortal, you will see the Immortal, if you now believe him: and so you will know that you have unjustly spoken against him.' This, it is to be observed, is not part of a formal defence of the
resurrection,
but of a general appeal to faith. Theophilus seems to have been acquainted with the work of Justin: but he had, none the less, a mind of his own.
St Irenaeus
The foregoing excerpts are evidence of a continuous tradition in expectation of a corporal resurrection, as well as of repeated need to defend it against heathen incredulity, heretical denial, and simple-minded doubt. There is no sufficient evidence that
Tertullian
was indebted to the apologists to the extent of copying their words or their arguments: the most that can be said is that he was not unacquainted with Justin and Theophilus, and that some of the themes and expressions used by the apologists had become common Christian property. With Irenaeus and Tertullian the case is different: the African was well acquainted with the work of the bishop of Lyons: and it seems likely that if he had not a copy of it before him as he wrote, he had committed its general
argument
and some of its expressions to a very retentive memory.
Besides casual references elsewhere, Irenaeus treats systematically of this subject in the first fifteen chapters of his fifth book Against the Heresies. With him, as with Tertullian, this question, or rather the defence of this doctrine, is intimately bound up with the truth of the Incarnation, and both these with the doctrine of creation and the unity of God. To recount here in detail Tertullian's borrowings from St Irenaeus would be tedious and would serve little purpose: in what follows only the most remarkable parallels will be noted.
1 Theophilus, Ad Autol. i. 7.
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Most of Tertullian's references to Scripture had already been made by Irenaeus. It is of some significance that the longest
continuous
quotations by both authors are of Ezek. 37. 1-14 (Irenaeus V.15. 1, Tertullian 29) and 1 Cor. 15. 12-18 (Irenaeus v. 13. 4, Tertullian 48). But no less significant are the differences. In Ezekiel Irenaeus quotes the Septuagint with only three slight variants: Tertullian seems to have made, or procured, an
independent
translation from a faulty Hebrew text. Both agree that the last verb in verse 14 is future, as in LXX
kai\ poh&sw, where the Latin vulgate and the English versions (wrongly, as it appears) have the perfect. In 1 Corinthians again Irenaeus gives, as far as the Latin version shows, an accurate transcript of the Greek: while Tertullian to some extent abbreviates, evidently quoting from memory. Both writers pay particular attention to
1 Cor. 15, examining the whole chapter, with intent to place in its proper perspective the apostolic admission that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God. They agree in the suggestion that flesh and blood, while incapable of inheriting anything, are not incapable of being inherited, and that the operation of the Spirit can even make them competent to inherit: and here Tertullian, while reducing to logical order the somewhat discursive argument of Irenaeus, deprives it of its impressive emphasis on the effect of sacramental grace. The conjunction at 'For this I say', which is not in the Greek, but on which Tertullian bases a small argument, is also found without special comment in Irenaeus. Galatians 5.19 ff., quoted in full by Irenaeus (v. 11. 1) in illustration of his
interpretation
of 1 Cor. 15. 50, is barely referred to by Tertullian (§45) in connection with something else.
Irenaeus (V. 5. 1, 2) cites Enoch and Elijah as evidence that natural human flesh is capable of being taken into heaven: and in answer to a doubt whether it can be supposed to have continued so long undecayed, he instances Jonah whose flesh remained
undigested,
and the three children whose flesh was unhurt by Babylonian fire. Tertullian (§58) reduces this to one sentence, placing Jonah and the three children first. Lazarus, and the daughter of Jairus, with the young man at Nain, are discussed at some length by Irenaeus (V. 13. 1): Tertullian mentions Lazarus at
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§53, and refers to all three without naming them in one sentence of §38.
The apostolic prayer, 1
Thess. v. 23, is cited as conclusive by both authors, but with a significant difference of emphasis: Tertullian treats it as clinching an argument already completed (§47), whereas Irenaeus makes it the basis of further and greater expectations and of an appeal to faith and righteousness.
The following details are worth recording. Irenaeus (v. 3.2), in a description of the parts of the body, says that the blood is copulatio animae et corporis, a remark which Tertullian does not repeat. Irenaeus (v. 4. 1) makes the point, repeated by Tertullian, that if there is no resurrection the reason is either that God could not or that he would not do it: and that in the former case God is subservient to material things, or in the latter case is less beneficent than we have been taught to expect. At v. 6. 1 Irenaeus openly says that the Son and the Holy Spirit are manus patris, a
proposition
on which Tertullian will only use the indefinite quaecumque sunt (§6). At v. 7. 1 Irenaeus remarks that spirit cannot rightly be called mortale corpus: which perhaps suggested Tertullian's
insistence
that soul cannot be corpus animale or corpus animatum, but must be corpus animans. At v. 8. 1 Irenaeus, quoting Eph. i. 13, explains pignus as pars eius honoris qui a deo nobis promissus est, with much more of great pastoral interest: Tertullian (§53), keeping the Greek word arrabo, drops most of the comment. At §51 he uses the same word in a noble statement of the consequence of Christ's ascension for all humanity. Irenaeus (v. 10. 3), no less than Tertullian, insists that 'Those who are in the flesh cannot please God' has a moral, not a physical, implication; etenim ipse in carne cum esset scribebat eis. Both writers several times quote the LXX mistranslation of Isa. 25. 8,
kate/pien o( qa&natoj i0sxu&saj, usually in a context where its omission would involve no great loss to the argument. Finally, one may ask whether Tertullian's question (§56) Quomodo canam illi novum canticum, nesciens me esse qui gratiam debeam? was suggested by Irenaeus v. 13. 3, Absorbetur autem mortale a vita quando et caro iam non mortua sea viva et
incorrupta
perseveraverit, hymnum dicens deo qui in hoc ipsum perficit nos.
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THE TEXTUAL TRADITION
[The information here given is for the most part adapted, with this ateful acknowledgement, from the Preface to Tertullian's works in Corpus Christianorum (Turnholt, 1953) and from the Monitum prefixed
to Dr Borleffs' edition of the text in the second volume of that series.]
This work, under the title De Carnis Resurrectione or De Resurrectione
Mortuorum, was preserved in three of the four collections in which Tertullian's works have come down to us. It is not, and apparently never was, contained in the ninth-century codex Agobardinus, now at Paris (B.N. 1622), though its companion De Carne Christi is in part contained there. The text as now constructed depends on these groups of authorities:
I Codex Trecensis [T], formerly at Clairvaux and now at Troyes (523), the only extant representative of a collection of five treatises made apparently in the fifth century, perhaps (it is suggested) by Vincent of Lérins. This manuscript has
comparatively
recently come to light, having been discovered by Dom Wilmart in 1916. It is of the highest value, though not an unimpeachable witness, for the reconstruction of the text, frequently differing in detail (as was to be expected) from manuscripts of a different tradition. It was, however,
carelessly
written, many sentences and clauses being omitted by homoeoteleuton.
II A group of manuscripts, apparently derived at first or second hand from a codex (now lost) which was at Cluny in the eleventh century, and seems itself to have been derived from a collection of twenty-one treatises, made in Spain, perhaps under the direction of St Isidore, bishop of Seville (600-36). Its most important representatives are
Codex Montepessulanus [M] (Montpellier H 54), of the
eleventh century.
Codex Paterniacensis [P] (Schlettstadt 439), also of the eleventh century.
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Codex Magliabechianus [F] (Florence, conv. soppr. I. vi. 9),
dated 1426.
Codex Magliabechianus [N] (Florence, conv. soppr. I. vi. 10),
also of the fifteenth century.
The last two appear to be copies of two now lost manuscripts of the Cluny group, both of which were known to Beatus Rhenanus and were used by him in his first and third editions (1521, 1539).
III A group of manuscripts once existed, derived from a codex formerly at Corbey, containing five treatises of Tertullian and Novatian, De Trinitate, works collected apparently in the fifth century by some Montanist or Novatianist. No
manuscripts
of this group survive: but it appears that copies of it, which were formerly at Corbey and Cologne, were known to the Englishman John Clements, who communicated their readings to Pamelius. Mesnart also and Gelenius had access to codices of this family.
The present edition of the text follows that of Dr Borleffs as closely as possible, and its apparatus criticus is abbreviated from the very full information given by him concerning the manuscripts T, M, and P (already mentioned) and
Codex Luxemburgensis [X] (Luxemburg 75), a fifteenth-century manuscript of composite origin containing twenty-one treatises. It usually agrees with M and P.
Dr Borleffs has himself collated or scrutinized these four manuscripts.
Rightly, as it appears, he does not quote the readings of the two Florentine manuscripts, judging that they are well enough represented by Rhenanus, who used the books they were copied from. Like other modern editors, Dr Borleffs prefers the
testimony
of T except where it is manifestly impossible: in the present edition the same course is followed, but with some reserve. A list of manuscripts and editions appears at the head of the Latin text.
Q. SEPTIMII FLORENTIS TERTULLIANI DE RESURRECTIONE CARNIS LIBER
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